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BOOK REVIEWS
Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy, edited by Nicholas D. Smith and 
Paul Woodruﬀ . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiv and 226. 
$50.00 (Cloth).
VICKI LYNN HARPER, St. Olaf College
This groundbreaking collection of essays analyzes the evidence for 
Socratic views on reason and religion. Taking the charges of impiety at 
Socrates’ trial seriously, it rejects a previously accepted view that the 
motives behind Socrates’ conviction were purely political. Most of the 
authors (a notable exception is Asli Gocer) agree that Socrates held in-
novative religious views and that progress towards understanding these 
is possible. The project was inspired by a workshop held at the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin in 1996, “Reason and Religion in Fift h-Century 
Greece.” Six of the nine essays included in this volume are published here 
for the fi rst time. Three of these, by C. D. C. Reeve, Mark L. McPherran, 
and Stephen A. White, grew directly out of presentations at the Austin 
workshop. Three more, by Richard Kraut, Asli Grocer and Paul Woodruﬀ , 
are on related topics. These six new essays are well complemented by 
selections from previously published books by Gregory Vlastos, Robert 
Parker, and Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith which helped 
to shape the debates. The essays are framed by an informative introduc-
tion and, as a grand fi nale, selections from private correspondence about 
Socrates and his daimonion among Vlastos, Brickhouse, McPherran, and 
Smith, edited by Woodruﬀ . Both the introduction and the selected cor-
respondence serve to articulate precise questions, and to elucidate the 
meaning(s) of key terms defi ning the issues under debate. In some cases 
clarifi cation dissolves apparent disagreement; in others, it reveals more 
precisely what the disagreements are.
The issues involved are complex and intertwined. First, there is the 
distinction between the historical Socrates, and Socrates as portrayed in 
Plato’s “Socratic” dialogues or, more generally, the distinction between 
historical analysis of Athenian society and religion, and the interpreta-
tion and philosophical evaluation of Plato’s dialogues. Several of the 
essays tackle historical questions head on. In chapter 3 (an excerpt from 
his 1996 book, Athenian Religion: A History), Robert Parker investigates 
the trial of Socrates, and historical questions about Athenian society and 
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Greek religion. Noting that, historically, political and religious factors 
in Athenian society were intertwined, he concludes that it “will not do, 
therefore, to deny a given incident all religious content simply because 
political factors also intrude” (p. 42). If Socrates’ piety was a genuine is-
sue at the trial, does it make sense to construe the charges against him as 
motivated by concerns about a rationalist threat to traditional religious 
beliefs? Parker explores the question whether there was a genuine “reli-
gious crisis” in the second half of the fi ft h century. He rejects the idea that 
traditional religion was seriously undermined at that time, and argues 
cogently that ancient evidence for a plethora of trials for impiety is unreli-
able. (Thus he rebuts E. R. Dodds’s well-known view, in The Greeks and the 
Irrational (1951), that there was wide-ranging oppression against innova-
tive intellectuals.) Yet Parker does conclude that, in a sense, there was a re-
ligious crisis, because speculative thought was seen by some as a religious 
threat (p. 46). In chapter 7, “A New Assessment of Socratic Philosophy 
of Religion,” Asli Gocer focuses on the paucity of reliable historical evi-
dence and concludes that “no confi dent conclusion is possible regarding 
either the alleged religious crisis, or the extent of the nonconformism of 
Socrates” (p. 125). Perhaps not, but plausible speculation about possibili-
ties can be fruitful, and this still leaves plenty of room for the interpreta-
tion of Plato’s Socrates. In chapter 9, “Socrates at Colonus: A Hero for the 
Academy,” Stephen A. White argues in fascinating detail for the historical 
claim that Plato created a new cult at the Academy, honoring Socrates as a 
hero while celebrating philosophy as “the highest form of piety” (p. 168). 
He assesses this as transformative, in that it changed traditional cult “into 
something more humane, more edifying, and more in harmony with So-
cratic rationalism” (p. 168).
In chapter 1, “Socrates, Politics, and Religion,” Richard Kraut addresses 
the historical question of why Socrates was tried and convicted, as well 
as the philosophical question of what lessons we should draw from that 
event. Kraut argues that the charges against Socrates were motivated by 
genuine religious issues, as well as by political considerations. Philosophi-
cally, he argues that the trial of Socrates raises a perennial dilemma: “that 
there is an unresolvable tension between the claims of the religious or 
moral conscience and the legitimate needs of the community” (p. 22). In 
this essay Kraut does not address the question of what legitimates a com-
munity’s “needs,” though he does explicitly disavow conventional ethical 
relativism (p. 20).
Woodruﬀ  holds that Plato’s “Socratic” dialogues are anachronistic, in 
that Plato’s Socrates expresses fourth-century ideas (chapter 8, “Socrates 
and the Irrational”). He argues that Plato’s Socrates rejects both sides 
of the fi ft h-century debate between reason and religion; that he views 
the rationalist projects of fi ft h-century sophists and natural scientists as 
failures, but also rejects religion because he makes philosophical activity 
and moral consciousness displace the traditional gods. Woodruﬀ  argues 
that, for Plato’s Socrates, moral sense works through shame, a concept 
which he rehabilitates, along with certain aspects of traditional culture. 
This is innovative in that it “moves the issues on to new ground, using 
rational ideas and methods his rationalist contemporaries had not con-
sidered” (pp. 130–31).
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C. D. C. Reeve also focuses on Plato’s Socrates, without taking a stand 
on his relation to the historical Socrates (chapter 2: “Socrates the Apol-
lonian?”). In exploring the relation between Plato’s Socrates and Apollo, 
Reeve confronts some central issues for the interpretation of Socratic 
theology: To what extent is it rational or non-rational, what is Socrates’ 
daimonion, his divine sign, and how does it relate to the traditional gods 
of Greek religion? On the basis of textual analysis of the Apology, Reeve 
makes a surprisingly strong case for connecting Socrates’ daimonion with 
the Delphic Apollo. This undermines rationalized interpretations, such as 
Nussbaum’s analysis of the daimonion as the voice of human reason (Pro-
ceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, edited by D. 
Cleary, Vol. 1 (1985): pp. 234–35), but brings to the fore the question why 
Socrates’ religious views should have been seen as threatening. Reeve sees 
Socratic theology as comprised of both rational and non-rational elements, 
but analyzes the daimonion as a Delphic Apollonian blessing upon Socrates’ 
mission, the rational pursuit of philosophy. He suggests that Socrates’ ac-
cuser, Meletus, “is on to something about Socrates, that he has propheti-
cally if inchoately sensed the threat to Greek religion that Socrates’ ratio-
nalism poses” (p. 37).
The heart of the debate about how to interpret Socratic theology is 
the question whether it views reason as consistent with religious com-
mitments and, if not, what “trumps” what. The question of what is 
innovative about Socrates’ theology is related to this. The crux of the mat-
ter is sharply stated by Vlastos in chapter 4, “Socratic Piety,” an excerpt 
from his classic 1991 work Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher: “Socrates’ 
commitment to reasoned argument as the fi nal arbiter of claims to truth 
in the moral domain is evident throughout Plato’s dialogues. . . . And yet 
he is also committ ed to obeying commands reaching him through super-
natural channels” (p. 55). With respect to the fi rst commitment, Vlastos 
emphasizes Crito 45b: “Not now for the fi rst time, but always, I am the sort 
of man who is persuaded by nothing in me except the proposition which 
appears to me to be best when I reason . . . about it” (translated by Vlastos, 
p. 55). How can Socrates see these commitments as consistent? (Vlastos 
takes Plato’s Socratic dialogues, supplemented by Xenophon, to be reli-
able evidence for Socratic thought. I shall not address that issue here.) 
According to Vlastos, Socrates’ commitment to his daimonion and divine 
signs allows “unlimited scope” (p. 61) for the use of critical reason: “These 
two commitments cannot confl ict because only by the use of his own criti-
cal reason can Socrates determine the true meaning of any of the signs” (p. 
62). Moreover, Socrates rationalizes the gods in making them moral and 
wise. In interpreting divine will, Socrates must consider what is consistent 
with this rationalized conception of divine nature (compare Socrates’ dis-
cussion of piety in the Euthyphro). As Vlastos clarifi es the point in a lett er 
to Brickhouse, Socrates would get “personal” or “subjective reassurance” 
from his daimonion “only when he already has rational grounds for a certain 
action (or belief)” (p. 197).
In chapter 4, “Socrates’ Gods and the Daimonion,” Brickhouse and Smith 
argue that whenever Socrates responds to the opposition of his divine sign 
by desisting from some contemplated action (e.g., addressing the Assem-
bly at Apology 31c7–d5), his daimonion trumps reason in that it overrides 
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“whatever reasons he might have had for taking the action in the fi rst 
place” (p. 83). On their view, “Socrates would count certain forms of divi-
nation—especially his own daimonion—as providing sources of informa-
tion that are largely independent of Socrates” own rationcination” (p. 82). 
Mark McPherran is also critical of Vlastos’s analysis. In the private cor-
respondence (beautifully edited and usefully prefaced by Woodruﬀ ), he 
concludes that “reason does not have complete and free interpretive reign 
or primary authority in the case of the daimonion” (Lett er 9, McPherran 
to Vlastos, p. 187). According to McPherran, “The fact that the daimonion 
provides a kind of certain knowledge as well as the grounds for practical 
certainty is made apparent by Socrates’ unwavering confi dence that the 
daimonion is always caused by a divine source that would never purpose-
fully mislead him” (p. 187). Vlastos concedes that “unlimited scope” for 
critical reason is too strong; he did not mean to claim that interpretation is 
so open-ended that the daimonion’s injunctions have no descriptive content 
(Lett er 19, Vlastos to Brickhouse, p. 197). But he stoutly maintains that the 
daimonion is not an independent, non-rational source of knowledge (Let-
ter 6, Vlastos to McPherran, p. 183). This point raises fundamental epis-
temological questions about what counts as knowledge, and about what 
sort of knowledge Socrates is looking for in the Socratic dialogues. The 
correspondence clarifi es a diﬀ erence between “moral” or “practical” cer-
tainty and epistemic certainty. In the end, all parties to the debate, includ-
ing Mcpherran, reject the idea that Socrates has a dualist epistemology, 
“that he thought that there were two kinds of knowledge, fallible knowl-
edge, derivable through elenctic searching, and certain knowledge deriv-
able from a non-rational source, namely divination” (Lett er 6, Vlastos to 
Mcpherran, p. 183). But the interlocutors agree to disagree on whether 
Socrates’ trust in his daimonion is greater than his trust in “the products 
of ratiocination” (Lett er 22, Vlastos to Smith, p. 199). Part of the trouble 
seems to be that there is no clear test case in the dialogues. As Vlastos 
maintains, there seems to be no decisive textual support for the hypotheti-
cal claim that “if Socrates has rational grounds for doing (or not doing) X 
a sign to the contrary from the daimonion would trump them” (Lett er 24, 
Vlastos to Smith, p. 202).
What is innovative about Socratic theology? Brickhouse and Smith do 
not see Socrates’ moralization of the gods as particularly innovative, nor 
as a plausible reason for the charges of impiety: “there is no ancient evi-
dence for supposing that his contemporaries were troubled by Socrates’ 
alleged ethical transformation of the gods” (p. 76). And several of the 
authors (McPherran, Brickhouse, and Smith, Reeve, and Woodruﬀ ) dis-
cuss ways in which Socrates respects or rehabilitates traditional religious 
practices and beliefs. But this is still consistent with McPherran’s eloquent 
summation, with which I concur: “Socrates, in short, raised the stakes for 
living a life of piety considerably by making its fi nal measure not correct 
and timely religious practice, but rather, the actual state of one’s philo-
sophically purifi ed soul” (p. 102).
This collection succeeds admirably in achieving its stated aims (p. 11) 
of presenting good recent scholarship on Socrates and religion, and of in-
viting further refl ection upon Socrates’ place in the history of religion, as 
well as in the history of philosophy. 
